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In this book, a French neurobiologist, Jean-Pierre 
Changeux, tackles one—and by no means the least per-
ilous—of biology’s last frontiers. His subject is the neu-
robiological basis of why human beings make judgments 
about what is good, true or beautiful, and how we make 
them. Changeux was trained as a molecular biologist 
by Jacques Monod, who, of all the founders of molecu-
lar biology, best understood both evolution and animal 
behavior. Monod knew and appreciated the ethologist 
Konrad Lorenz. In 1976, Changeux was called to the 
Collège de France, where he used his molecular biological 
techniques to understand the human brain and nervous 
system. The French edition of his book explicitly draws 
on courses he gave there. His book claims the attention 
of this Journal’s readers, first through its concern with 
consciousness, whose material basis is still far from clear 
even though it allows us to understand ourselves, other 
people and even other animals (Weyl 1949, p. 283); sec-
ond, through its focus on understanding the human 
brain, the last redoubt from which some theologians still 
hope to demonstrate limits on the efficacy or relevance of 
Darwinian evolution by natural selection.
The Good, the True and the Beautiful is a comprehen-
sively reorganized, considerably abridged translation by 
Laurence Garey of Changeux’s (2008) Du vrai, du beau, 
du bien: une nouvelle approche neuronale. By clarifying 
the neurobiological basis of human judgments on good-
ness, truth and beauty, Changeux hopes to build a bridge 
between the humanities and neurobiology, even though 
he realizes that some will view the project as “an abu-
sive, even an illegitimate impertinence” (Changeux 1997, 
p. 274). His credentials as a humanist are impressive. 
Changeux’s (1985, 2002; Changeux and Ricoeur 2000) 
books skillfully deploy the insights of people as varied as 
Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza and Diderot. A seri-
ous art collector, Changeux (1994) has written on the 
neurobiology of appreciating and collecting art. Most 
remarkably, Changeux was sufficiently interested in how 
to convince humanists of the material basis of mind, 
thought and feeling that he engaged a Christian moral 
philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, in a published dialogue on the 
subject (Changeux and Ricoeur 2000). This dialogue is an 
unusually serious and effective attempt to achieve mutual 
understanding.
After three pages of introduction, the English version 
starts with Changeux’s chapter on the Beautiful. In both 
versions, this chapter centers on appreciating works 
of art. Changeux emphasizes that art depends on asso-
ciation of memories: association enabled by the great 
expansion of the human brain’s associational cortex, 
which involves both emotion and reason. Any reader 
of T. S. Eliot knows how his poetry depends on evoking 
associations of memories, images and emotions: as with 
poetry, so with art and music. Empathy, sympathy and 
reason are essential ingredients of morality, as Darwin 
(1871) realized. Neurobiological bases of empathy and 
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sympathy are being progressively elucidated, as this book 
shows and later work such as Marsh et al. (2014) abun-
dantly confirms.
Trying to define beauty, Changeux summarizes views 
from Plato onward, singling out Plato’s dialogue “Greater 
Hippias,” from which he extracts two definitions: “formal 
appropriateness, where the unity of the whole triumphed 
over the multiplicity of its parts,” and more especially, 
the harmony of those parts in the service of a beneficial 
function. Haldane’s (1932: 162) remarkable understate-
ment, “in the cases of sexual selection and the evolution 
of flowers, survival value has been determined by ani-
mal aesthetics, which are not altogether unlike our own” 
suggests that Plato’s view echoes ancient instinct. Then, 
after discussing the physics and neurobiology of see-
ing and hearing, Changeux turns to the role of empathy 
and sympathy in creating and appreciating art. He sees 
art as first gripping the viewer by an emotion—delight in 
something’s or someone’s beauty, sorrow at a depicted 
grief, anger at a depicted wrong. This grip depends on 
the artwork’s ability to arouse the reader’s empathy or 
sympathy with the artist’s own response. Creating such a 
work of art involves not only inspiration but a great deal 
of trial and error—comparing the effectiveness of differ-
ent designs or coloring as a writer compares the effective-
ness of different wordings (p. 35). Empathy and sympathy 
have neurobiological bases: they are often aroused by 
facial expressions, such as pain or joy. Neurobiologists 
have long been preoccupied by the ability to recognize 
faces and infer emotions from facial expressions (p. 29). 
Changeux discusses studies by a French painter of Louis 
XIV’s time, Charles Le Brun, of the connection between 
facial expressions and the underlying emotions they 
reflect (pp. 67–70), which Darwin (1872) mentioned in 
his more general study. After the initial emotion, reason 
is used to understand, discipline and order the emotional 
reaction (p. 40).
Changeux (pp. 39–52) compares art and music: in both, 
beauty reflects appropriate harmony among their parts. 
Music, like painting, conveys emotions, and response 
to music has neurobiological bases. Martha Nussbaum 
(2013) gives a striking example from Mozart’s opera, 
the Marriage of Figaro, of how words and music can 
conjointly lend emotional punch to a reasonable belief. 
Many consider this opera a frivolous, defanged, version 
of a play Beaumarchais wrote to ridicule the hierarchical 
order of prerevolutionary France. In the opera, Figaro is 
as preoccupied by desire for honor, power, and revenge 
for wrongs real or imagined, as the Count and his allies 
whose designs Figaro seeks to foil. On the other hand, the 
opera’s women, particularly the Countess and her serv-
ant Susanna are habitually concerned with others, help-
ful, unconcerned with hierarchy and not vengeful—their 
attitudes are truly revolutionary, not just more of the 
same. Nussbaum (2013, pp. 40–53) shows how power-
fully the music reinforces the libretto’s message. Why did 
not others notice what she saw? True, Martha Nussbaum 
is uncommonly perceptive. The real lesson here, however, 
is that great art makes demands of its spectators as well 
as its creator, as Changeux (p. 61) emphasizes. Appreciat-
ing art involves an effortful collaboration between artist 
and spectator.
The following chapter, on the Good, opens by criticiz-
ing Hume’s distinction between what is and what ought 
to be (p. 71). This criticism will upset many, but even 
Plato, for all his emphasis on divine norms, remarked that 
a gang of thieves will cooperate effectively only if they 
can trust each other (an insight shared by an ancient Chi-
nese philosopher: Waley 1982, p. 74). Here, Plato inferred 
a (within-group!) golden rule from an empirically based 
thought-experiment. Natural selection favors coopera-
tion over cheating among members of a monkey group 
or honeybee colony, suggesting how, as Darwin (1871) 
argued, moral conclusions can emerge from empiri-
cal experience. Indeed, the idea that one cannot reason 
meaningfully about moral questions is one of the oddest 
of modern superstitions (Midgley 2003), one decisively 
refuted by Shakespeare’s plays. Here, Changeux discusses 
the origin of ethics, the natural, neurobiologically based 
human predisposition to moral judgment, and how cul-
tural evolution has shaped and changed social and cul-
tural norms during human history (p. 72). His brief 
discussion mentions the unusual human ability to infer 
the, knowledge, beliefs and intentions of others from 
their actions and facial expressions, and plan actions 
accordingly (p. 74); the instinctive tendency of a child (or 
other social mammal) to cease hurting companions when 
they show signs of pain or distress (p. 75); and the role 
of consciousness in imagining different modes of action 
and evaluating their moral consequences. Changeux cites 
how 4-year-old children distinguish social conventions 
such as dietary taboos, which they see as applying only to 
specific social groups, from universally obligatory moral 
rules against robbery, murder, slander &c (p. 77)—a dis-
tinction he hopes will help us form general moral rules 
applicable to all humanity, not just one tribe or nation (p. 
79). Changeux and Ricoeur (2000), however, present the 
neurobiology involved far more thoroughly.
The big puzzle about this chapter is what it omits. 
Following Spinoza, Changeux and Ricoeur (2000, p. 
222) argue that the most basic ethical virtue is self-
preservation. They quote Spinoza’s statement that “The 
[effort] to preserve oneself is the primary and sole basis 
of virtue.” This remark sounds horridly selfish, but 
Damasio (2003, p. 171), following Spinoza, remarks 
that the drive for self-preservation “leads to virtue 
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because in our inalienable need to maintain ourselves, 
we must, of necessity, help preserve other selves.” Pla-
to’s thieves knew this, as did Darwin (1871). Any ani-
mal that helps fellow group members lest its group 
dwindle to defenseless size (Leigh 2010, p. 15) acts as 
if its future depends on those others. Ethics can be 
founded on the instinct of self-preservation—after all, 
we are commanded to love others as we love ourselves. 
The instinctive desire for self-preservation must have 
a neurobiological basis (Damasio 2003, p. 171). Given 
Changeux’s respect for Spinoza, why did this chapter 
omit the principle by which natural selection would 
favor a proper ethics in sufficiently intelligent social 
animals (Darwin 1871)?
In the French edition, Changeux discusses the Good 
before the Beautiful: his views on art have a strong moral 
element, and presuppose some understanding of the neu-
robiological bases of ethical responses. The English edi-
tion’s discussion of the Good begins with ethical norms 
(pp. 71–80), whereas the French version prepares readers 
for this discussion. First, it surveys ideas on how and why 
human social life and associated ethical norms devel-
oped (pp. 103–115, 80–103 in the English version). Here, 
Changeux remarks how “the Golden Rule of moral con-
duct is common to most philosophical and religious tra-
ditions” (p. 107). This survey also includes an account of 
the various stages by which children’s awareness of oth-
ers advances until, at age four, they can infer intentions, 
beliefs and emotions of others; and evidence for the neu-
rological basis of feeling another’s pain (pp. 107–115 in 
the English version)—all useful background for discuss-
ing ethical norms. Next, Changeux discusses what cir-
cumstances cause natural selection to favor social life in 
animals (pp. 115–123). He considers kin selection, which 
drove the evolution of insect societies (Hamilton 1964), 
reciprocal altruism (tit for tat), and selection among 
groups. Darwin (1871, p. 166) invoked selection among 
tribes of hunter-gatherers, which numbered about 25 
individuals apiece (Boehm 2012, p. 80), to help explain 
the evolution of human morality—a reasonable view if 
the egalitarianism within such tribes equalizes repro-
ductive success among a tribe’s members (Boehm 1997). 
Changeux’s original order was judicious. Many will con-
sider a materialistic explanation of human ethics only if 
they understand how natural selection could favor such 
ethics. Although in the 17th century Spinoza’s Ethics 
showed why competition would favor social cooperation 
(Damasio 2003, p. 171) and Adam Smith (1776) made 
this plain as day a century later, many biologists still prate 
endlessly about the “paradoxical” prevalence of coop-
eration in a world shaped by the competitive process of 
natural selection. Given this situation among biologists, 
could ordinary readers know better?
The English edition’s chapter on Truth starts with a pro-
logue on the “naturalistic conception of the world” (pp. 
124–138). This prologue set the stage for the whole of the 
French edition, as it sets forth the philosophy, and some 
of the themes, of its project. Here, Changeux approvingly 
quotes Joëlle Proust: “A philosophical theory is natural-
istic when it recognizes as legitimate only those objec-
tive undertakings and explanatory principles normally 
recognized and adopted in the natural sciences” (p. 135). 
The main heroes of this prologue, however, are Charles 
Darwin and Karl Popper. Darwin showed how differential 
replication of different heritable variants creates a feed-
back between an environment and the adaptation thereto 
of its organisms. Thanks to this feedback, selection is not 
merely the simple filter imagined by Midgley (2014, p. 
71). Popper described how analogous feedback between 
different conjectures and their confrontation with obser-
vation or experimental test advanced scientific under-
standing by favoring ideas that represent reality better. 
These feedbacks have many analogues, ranging from 
the many “trial” representations of our surroundings 
from which our brain selects the best to present to our 
consciousness, to the many trials from which an artist 
or writer chooses the one that best achieves the desired 
effect. Changeux invokes many guises of trial and error.
In the English version, this prologue introduces a 
subchapter called “The Raging Beast—Cognition and 
Language,” the title of the French original’s Part II (of 
four). This is the beast Changeux seeks to tame. Hence-
forth, the two versions’ organization match. First, 
Changeux reviews past thought about consciousness (pp. 
138–146). He especially praises William James, who real-
ized that one’s sense of self is based on perceived con-
sciousness, emphasized the role of conscious memory in 
our sense of time, and argued that “the question of fact in 
the free-will controversy… relates solely to the amount of 
effort or attention which we can at any time put forth” (p. 
143). James’s view of free-will is shared by Midgley (2014, 
p. 104): “the idea of free will… concerns effort, which is a 
perfectly real causal factor.” Then Changeux documents 
the neural basis of different aspects of consciousness. 
He observes that lesions of different parts of the brain 
impair conscious (but often not unconscious) recogni-
tion of objects, familiar faces and perils like open flames 
(pp. 146–155). He shows how consciousness is revealed 
by the brain’s electrical activity—similar when awake and 
focusing on sensory inputs, or dreaming and attending to 
memories, but very different in unconscious deep sleep 
(pp. 155–160). Brain imagery reveals the parts of the 
brain involved in subjective experience, focused attention 
and perception (pp. 160–165). Finally he presents his own 
views, remarking that “Consciousness attained its apo-
gee through deliberation, which depends on judgment, 
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which is the result of impulse and inhibition” (p. 171). He 
views consciousness as a global neuronal workspace—
Monod (1971: 154–159 called it a “simulator”—that ima-
gines possible actions, and predicts and evaluates their 
consequences. This workspace integrates perceptions, 
memories, and evaluations of past actions and organizes 
suitable responses (pp. 171–176). He uses specific mod-
els, based on his understanding of brain architecture, to 
learn what neural processes are needed to deal with spe-
cific tasks which psychologists assign patients in order to 
diagnose their neural disorders. These processes involve 
long-axon associative neurons which connect differ-
ent parts of the brain, and short-axon neurons involved 
in specific subroutines, such as vision and movement, 
involved in executing the assigned task. Such long-axis 
neurons are most common in the brain’s frontal lobes, 
which are involved in tasks requiring conscious effort (p. 
179).
Alison Jolly (1966) argued that intelligence evolved in 
primates to cope with problems of social life. It is there-
fore fitting that Changeux next considers neurobiologi-
cal enablers of social life, especially communication. 
Although language encodes concepts and their rela-
tionships to communicate them, the meaning of speech 
depends on context: just as we unconsciously extract 
a pictorial hypothesis of our surroundings from a maze 
of visual data, so we infer (often equally unconsciously) 
the meaning of a spoken message using our picture of 
the speaker’s knowledge, beliefs and intentions (pp. 180–
184). Language involves effortful cooperation between 
speaker and hearer that requires both “theory of mind” 
and consciousness, which integrates input from uncon-
scious subroutines in different parts of the brain—such 
as that which infers an object from its various perspec-
tive views, that which stores memory, and that which 
evaluates remembered actions—to choose an appropriate 
response from the available possibilities. Theory of mind 
has a neural basis that includes mirror neurons, which 
fire similarly if an animal performs a complex action or 
if it sees another perform it (p. 185). Cerebral imaging 
reveals activity in several parts of the brain during tasks 
requiring “theory of mind.” Specific neural lesions impair 
abilities related to theory of mind, such as distinguishing 
self from nonself (pp. 186–187).
Noam Chomsky showed that children can learn to 
speak thanks to an “innate grammar,” a template for 
arranging words in meaningful sentences (p. 191). Lan-
guage hinges on asymmetry between the brain’s right and 
left halves—already evident in the skulls of Homo habilis, 
and progressively greater in H. erectus and H. sapiens (p. 
196). The neurobiological basis of speech is revealed by 
lesions in different parts of the brain impairing different 
aspects of speech, such as forming words, understanding 
them, or forming and relating concepts (p. 195). These 
lesions, like those impairing theory of mind, reveal a hier-
archy of layers of organization in the brain, from simple, 
rigid, automatic routines to complex, flexible, voluntary 
processes, the highest level being consciousness, which 
deliberates among competing alternatives. Higher levels 
evolved later, and lesions at higher levels induce failure 
to integrate different inputs, undoing the achievements 
of evolution (pp. 197–198). This helps us understand why 
behaviors of some small mammals are more automatic 
than they seem. Meerkats teach young how to handle dif-
ficult prey by bringing them progressively less disabled 
prey to deal with, but mothers judge how much to disable 
prey by the age of the young as revealed by the timbre of 
their calls, rather than direct assessment of their ability to 
handle prey (Thornton and McAuliffe 2006).
Integrating neural inputs presuppose suitable inter-
connections, synapses, among our brain’s 1011 neurons, 
which organize our sensations and coordinate them with 
our activity. Genes program the formation of synapses, 
about 10,000 of them per neuron, but synapses last only 
if used (p. 203). Blind children interpreting Braille coopt 
parts of their visual cortex to integrate and interpret tac-
tile stimuli (p. 208), using synapses that would otherwise 
die.
Now, Changeux turns to writing—forming visual signs 
denoting concepts, whose arrangement conveys rela-
tionships among the concepts (p. 209). Because writing 
can store knowledge for generations, often in movable 
form, it plays a vital role in cultural inheritance and cul-
tural evolution. He describes the progress of visual signs 
from prehistoric cave paintings with associated abstract 
signs (p. 211) to the independent invention of picto-ide-
ographic writing in Sumeria and Egypt before 3000 BC 
(p. 213), and the Sumerian invention of cuneiform, where 
the signs denoting both objects and concepts are sim-
pler and more abstract (p. 214). Later, ideograms in some 
monosyllabic languages became syllabograms where 
signs represent sounds. Alphabets, where letters denote 
sounds (p. 218), were invented about 1500 BC. Changeux 
shows how successive stages in this development were 
stimulated by the need for people of different cultures 
and languages to communicate (pp. 214–215, p. 219), 
Neurobiological bases of writing and reading, like those 
of speech and understanding, are revealed by the effects 
of different lesions, and cerebral imagery of people read-
ing (pp. 220–225).
Now Changeux turns to topics bearing less obviously 
on how minds work, discussing evolution, especially of 
the nervous system, from invertebrates to human beings. 
He models the morphogenetic processes causing the 
divergence of vertebrate from invertebrate brain and 
nerve cord (p. 246). He ascribes the increased size and 
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complexity of the human brain mostly to the increased 
complexity of its the network of interconnections (p. 
243), which genes control least precisely (pp. 256–257) 
and emphasizes how spontaneous electrical activity in 
the developing nervous system stimulate and preserve 
neural interconnections (pp. 257–265).
Next Changeux considers topics central to his own 
progress from molecular biochemist to neurobiologist. 
He discusses receptors of neurotransmitters—chemi-
cals that influence transmission of nerve impulses across 
synapses. He focuses on the function and molecular 
structure of receptors of acetyl choline and shows how 
they integrate various chemical inputs (pp. 272–292). A 
molecular model on how a sea slug learns a conditioned 
reflex (pp. 295–301) shows how far we are from a mecha-
nistic understanding of how we learn concepts. A section 
on the chemistry of consciousness (being awake rather 
than asleep) focuses mostly on how general anaesthetics 
affect transmission of neural impulses (pp. 301–313).
Then Changeux summarizes his previous work, giv-
ing a useful resumé of this book’s arguments; reflects on 
death and its significance; and closes with remarks about 
how science has promoted civil rights, and his hope that 
his work will enhance universal human understanding.
What has this book told us? Using evidence ranging 
from brain lesions to neuroanatomy, electrophysiology, 
the effect of anaesthetics and mind-altering chemicals 
and cerebral imaging, he shows that the brain is involved 
in and essential to emotional responses and conscious 
effort of all sorts, ranging from appreciating art to speak-
ing, writing, and judging between right and wrong, both 
intellectual and ethical. Neurobiology has revealed not 
only the loci of various aptitudes but how the brain coor-
dinates and integrates contributions from these apti-
tudes. He has not yet destroyed “the barrier that divides 
our subjective experience from the objective physiologi-
cal events that occur in out body” (Lorenz 1978, p. 169) 
although he finds objective signs of various subjective 
states. He gratifyingly refuses to focus on the objective 
to the exclusion of the subjective. To prove, however, that 
mind is made of matter, he must demonstrate the mate-
rial basis of consciousness, and that he has not yet done.
Following carefully in the footsteps of Darwin (1871), 
he does show when and how selection would favor 
the ability of intelligent social animals to make judg-
ments on the good, the true and the beautiful. I have no 
idea whether consciousness has a purely material basis. 
Changeux, however, has shown that consciousness is so 
enmeshed in matter that his project should be pursued. 
Phenomena such as dissipative structures—intricate, self-
organizing patterns appearing in chemical systems which 
input of energy keeps far from equilibrium (Prigogine 
1978) suggest properties of matter that Aristotle never 
dreamed of. Christians should expect that the matter 
they believe God created, when suitably arranged, can 
do more wonderful things than anyone ever expected, 
whether or not consciousness itself has a material basis.
Changeux’s prejudices will put off some readers. Unlike 
Changeux and Joëlle Proust (p. 34), the atheist Haldane 
(1927) thought that science was not the only source of 
truth. Other prejudices may do more damage. Describ-
ing human beings as “conscious automatons” seems to 
ignore the personal judgments involving unprogramma-
ble ideals such as beauty, simplicity and appropriateness, 
particularly important in art, mathematics and science 
but essential to all human behavior (Putnam 1992, pp. 
1–18). Changeux believes that the truths of mathemat-
ics are culture-dependent (Changeux and Connes 1995, 
pp. 31ff). The mathematician Alain Connes rightly denies 
this (Changeux and Connes 1995, p. 5). After all, there 
are exactly 17 kinds of “wallpaper symmetry” on a plane 
surface (Weyl 1951), no matter on what planet, no matter 
who if anyone is there to deduce or recognize this fact. 
Connes accepts that minds are material. Can material 
minds can apprehend immaterial truth? This possibility 
should not be dismissed unheard.
The question a humanist would ask about this book 
is whether its view of what it is to be a human being is 
too limited. Were this true, Changeux’s project would be 
dangerous. The tunnel-vision views of economic deter-
minists, communist and capitalist, of what human beings 
want from life, have been socially devastating (Bernanos 
1953; Nussbaum 1995). Changeux is a Darwinist, and 
some neoDarwinians have advanced remarkably limited 
views of human nature (Polkinghorne 2005, pp. 41–55; 
Midgley 2010). Dawkins (1976, p. 2) argued that “we, and 
all other animals, are machines created by our genes… a 
predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene 
is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usu-
ally give rise to selfishness in human behavior…” Wilson 
(1975) accepted this implication. Changeux, however, 
does not.
The difference between Changeux and Polkinghorne 
reflects what they have read. Changeux has read, marked, 
learned and inwardly digested Darwin’s (1871) Descent 
of Man, which argues convincingly that human beings 
inherited their social insects from their social primate 
ancestors, which could not afford to act like egoists. Polk-
inghorne, by contrast, read neoDarwinians with an overly 
one-dimensional view of human beings, such as Wilson 
(1975), whose view of human nature is as limited as that 
of any economic determinist, but not other Darwinians 
who view human beings in an ampler social and intel-
lectual context, such as Lorenz (1978), Durham (1991) 
and Changeux and Ricoeur (2000). Polkinghorne (2005), 
moreover, failed to recognize that faculties such as 
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language, conceptual thought and reason that enhanced 
survival, ability to cooperate or attractiveness to mates, 
could also find other, unexpected uses, such as theoreti-
cal physics or music. Indeed, Changeux would have been 
wise to emphasize that faculties evolved for one purpose 
often find other, sometimes life-transforming uses.
Whether, and if so how soon, the research program 
Changeux outlines here will attain its goal, I cannot say. 
I do not think that someone who has exposed his work 
to criticism by a moral philosopher of the stature of Paul 
Ricoeur has a seriously inadequate view of what it means 
to be human. I think Changeux’s project is worth doing, 
indeed, of exceptional interest. In sum, I recommend this 
book as a genuinely useful attempt to bridge the sciences 
and the humanities. It gives the reader a lot to think 
about.
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